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Abstract 
Economic literature has identified two potential types of racial discrimination in sports 
careers: exit discrimination and wage discrimination. The authors test for both types of 
discrimination in National Basketball Association (NBA) data in two ways. First using a 
modified Heckman procedure, they control for potential survival bias that may arise from 
exit discrimination in panel data and could possibly bias the coefficients of wage 
equations. Not controlling for survival bias could lead to false conclusions concerning 
the presence of pay discrimination. Using 1990-2008 NBA data, the authors fail to find 
any evidence of either pay or exit discrimination in the NBA utilizing this new technique. 
In one specification, however, a negative coefficient on the white dummy is found after 
controlling for height and being foreign-born suggesting that reverse discrimination is 
present. Yet, using a subset of the panel data used to examine pay discrimination in the 
NBA with career earnings the authors find that there is a pay premium paid to White 
players over their career in the magnitude of 16%–20%, ceteris paribus. Neither of 
these results, however, is robust and highlights the pitfalls of using the residual method 
in measuring both pay and exit discrimination. 
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Introduction 
Findings of discrimination in labor markets tend to garner much attention. This was 
particularly true when Kahn and Sherer (1988) proclaimed there was pay discrimination 
in the National Basketball Association (NBA) for Black players, despite a roughly similar 
prevailing average salary. The magnitude of the pay discrimination was said to be in the 
20% range. This stirred quite a discussion in a sport where about 75%–80% of the 
players were Black. A summary of the findings even made it to the popular press. 
Proclamations of racial discrimination always elicit notoriety. Findings of no 
discrimination do not procure the same response. Therefore, it is important that any 
positive findings of racially unequal treatment be particularly robust. 
 
In addition to findings of wage discrimination in the NBA, there have been findings of 
exit discrimination. Hoang and Rascher (1999) found evidence that White players were 
employed longer in the NBA than comparable Black players. This form of discrimination 
could be responsible for an even greater shortfall in pay for Black athletes than the 
more commonly researched wage discrimination. 
 
From research on exit discrimination it is clear that individuals with greater ability have a 
higher survival rate. This leads to an overrepresentation of high ability workers at high 
levels of experience. This suggests that the coefficients of explanatory variables, 
including race, may be biased because in a panel data set the observations are not 
random. 
 
In this article, we explore a modified-Heckman correction technique to correct for 
potential survival bias in wage equations using data from the 1990-2008 time period. 
This technique provides a logical extension of previous work on pay discrimination and 
exit discrimination by incorporating the results of exit discrimination into the wage 
equations directly. Further, we construct a subset of players whose entire careers 
began and ended within the 20-year period encompassed by our overall panel of data 
and test for discrimination in career earnings. In the next section, we provide a review of 
the previous literature on pay discrimination and exit discrimination in the NBA. Then we 
discuss how the inverse Mill’s ratio can be used to correct for survival bias in wage 
equations. We then present the regression results for our wage equations using random 
effects panel estimates on salaries with one specification corrected using the inverse 
Mill’s ratio and one using the standard model. In the remaining empirical section of the 
article, we explain the development of a new approach to examining discrimination 
using career earnings. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the results concerning 
racial pay discrimination in the NBA and possible avenues for future research. 
 
Literature Review 
Following the article of Kahn and Sherer (1988) which used salary data from the 1985-
1986 season, articles by Brown, Spiro, and Keenan (1991) and Koch and Vander Hill 
(1988) using 1984-1985 season salary estimated pay premiums for White players of 
15% and 9%, respectively, based on a standard residual methodology using dummy 
variables for race. All three studies cite fan discrimination as the driving force behind 
pay discrimination. 
Articles by Dey (1997), Gius and Johnson (1998), and Bodvarsson and Brastow (1999) 
using data from the late 1980s and 1990s failed to find racial wage discrimination. 
Hamilton (1997) found evidence of racial pay differences only at the upper end of the 
1994-1995 season’s salary distribution. Bodvarsson and Brastow (1999) suggested the 
disappearance of the pay discrimination in the NBA was the result of a decrease in 
owner monopsony power due to the negotiation of a new NBA Collective Bargaining 
Agreement in 1988 combined with the addition of four new teams. They also provide 
empirical evidence that at least part of the racial salary gap was the result of owner and 
manager discrimination, not just fan discrimination. Except for the article by Dey (1997), 
all the research in this area used single season salary data for model estimation. Dey 
used pooled data from five seasons in some of his empirical work.  
 
Hill (2004) used an 11-year panel data set beginning with 1990 salaries and ending with 
2000 salaries. While the coefficients for the dummy variable for White players were 
positive and significant in 1990 and 1991 individual year regression equations, the 
positive and significant finding in the overall pooled regression disappeared when height 
was added as an explanatory variable. Using data from the same year as Kahn and 
Sherer (1988), Hill also finds that the significance of race as a determinant of pay wanes 
when height is added to the model. Kahn and Shah (2005) claim, “For players who were 
neither free agents nor on rookie scale contracts, there were large statistically 
significant ceteris paribus nonwhite shortfalls in salary, total compensation, and contract 
duration.’’ One weakness of their analysis, however, was that only 21 White players and 
75 non-White players fell into this category of NBA player. 
 
In addition to wage discrimination, exit discrimination has been addressed in the sports 
economic literature. Hoang and Rascher (1999) define exit discrimination as ‘‘the 
involuntary dismissal of workers based on the preferences of employers, coworkers, or 
customers.’’ They concluded that career length for Black players in the NBA were lower 
than their White counterparts, ceteris paribus. Hoang and Rascher calculate that this 
form of discrimination led to almost a 2½ times greater decrease in Black career pay 
compared to the more heavily analyzed form of pay discrimination. Groothuis and Hill 
(2004) also focusing on career duration but on a later time period than Hoang and 
Racher (1999) found that performance and weight of the basketball player determined 
career length. They, however, found that the race of the player did not matter. The 
results of both the wage and exit discrimination literature suggest that both exit and 
wage discrimination existed in the NBA but have diminished with time. 
 
Data Description 
The data set used in this study consists of yearly performance statistics for NBA players 
between 1990 and 2008, salary figures between 1990 and 2008, and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Means. 
 
 
biographical data, which consists of height, weight, birth date, and a dummy variable 
equal to zero for African American players and one otherwise, and a dummy variable for 
foreign-born players.1 Body mass index (BMI) was also calculated for each player; BMI 
equals weight, in pounds, times 703 divided by height, measured in inches, squared. 
Each player’s draft number ranging from 1 for the first player selected to 60 for the last 
player selected. 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our overall data set and for the subset of 
White and Black players, respectively. The salary figures indicate that Black players 
enjoyed a substantially higher salary on average than White players. Keep in mind that 
these figures are in nominal terms over a 19-year span. Average career length for our 
sample is 6.95 seasons with Black players averaging almost a full season longer career 
span than White players: 7.24 versus 6.29. White players in our study are over two 
inches taller on average than their Black counterparts, 80.8 inches compared to 78.7 
inches. However, the BMI is the same for all players. Black players outperform White 
players by a wide margin on three of the four performance statistics used in our study: 
points per season, rebounds per season, and assists per season; only blocks per 
season are equal between the groups. The draft number is lower on average for Black 
players by about three spots in the draft, 35.5 versus 38.3; Black players are selected 
earlier on average on draft day. A little over 21% of our sample consists of White 
players; 7% of the sample is foreign-born. 
 
Duration Effects and Sample Selection Bias 
In an attempt to combine both the wage and exit discrimination literature, we use a 
modified Heckman procedure to control for both exit discrimination and survival bias in 
panel study wage equations. The Heckman (1979) procedure has long been used by 
economists to control for self-selection in a sample. In our case, we suggest that both 
performance and race may change the likelihood of survival in the NBA. We explore if a 
modified Heckman procedure controls for survival bias in wage equations. Following 
Greene’s (1997) notation, consider the basic sample selection model where, 
 
(1)    
 
(2)    
 
and y is only observed if di is equal to 1. Suppose as well that u and e have a bivariate 
normal distribution with zero means and a correlation of r. Then 
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Where l(au) is the inverse Mill’s ratio. The overall equation of interest becomes 
 
(8)    
 
Thus the marginal effect of a regressor in the observed sample consists of two parts 
 
(9)    
 
where the first part b is the marginal effect of the observed equation and g is the 
influence the variable has on the likelihood of being observed. Heckman (1979) 
recommends a two-step procedure: first, estimate a probit on the selection equation to 
obtain estimates of g. Then estimate the random effects panel regression along with the 
inverse Mill’s ratio to estimate b and bl. Verbeek and Nijman (1992) show that for a 
random effects panel Heckman’s (1979) lambda (l) is appropriate as long as there is no 
individual effects in the probit selection equation. This is the case in our selection 
equation of career duration. 
 
In our case, the selection equation comes from Equation 1 from the above career 
duration model. To calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio, we estimate semi-parametric 
hazard functions following Berger and Black (1988), Berger, Black, and Scott (2004), 
and Groothuis and Hill (2004); since our data is at the season level we calculate our 
hazard model as a discrete random variable. As with Berger et al., we model the 
durations of a single spell and assume a homogeneous environment so that the length 
of the spell is uncorrelated with the calendar time in which the spell begins. This 
assumption lets us treat all the players’ tenure as the same, regardless of when it 
occurred in the panel study. For instance, all fourth-year players are considered to have 
the same baseline hazard, regardless of calendar time so a fourth-year player in 1990 
has the same baseline hazard as a fourth-year player in 1997. 
 
As the hazard function is the conditional probability of exiting NBA, given that the NBA 
career lasted until the previous season, the hazard function must have a range from 0 to 
1. In principle, any mapping with a range from 0 to 1 will work. For our purposes we 
choose the probit model. We choose the probit model over the more traditional logit 
model in hazard models because the probit model provides the benefit of the ability to 
calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio. 
 
The intuition behind the probit model for the hazard function is relatively simple. For 
each year during the survey in which the player is in NBA, the player either comes back 
for another season or ends his career. If the career ends, the dependent variable takes 
on a value of 1; otherwise, the dependent variable is 0. The player remains in the panel 
until the player exits NBA or the panel ends. If the panel ends, we say the worker’s spell 
is right-hand censored. Thus a player who begins his NBA career during the panel and 
plays for 6 years will enter the data set 6 times: the value of his dependent variable will 
be 0 for the first 5 years (tenure 1 through 5) and be equal to 1 for the sixth year. 
 
To illustrate a stock sample, consider another player who enters the panel with 7 years 
of NBA job tenure prior to 1989 the first year of the panel, then plays for an additional 3 
years for a 10-year career. For this player, we ignore his first 7 years of tenure because 
he is left-hand censored. As the equation of the likelihood function with stock data 
indicates, the duration of a NBA career prior to the beginning of the panel makes no 
contribution to the value of the likelihood function. Therefore, only years 8through 10 will 
enter the data set with the dependent variable taking on the value 0 for years 8 and 9 
and in the 10th year it takes on a value of 1 with this player appearing in the data set a 
total of 3 times. Note for all players who are right-hand censored, we do not know when 
their career ends so their dependent variables are always coded as 0. 
 
Because the players in the panel have varying degrees of job tenure prior to the 
beginning of the panel, we identify the hazard function for both long and short careers. 
The disadvantage to this approach is that the vector of dummy variables to control for 
each year of tenure can be very large. In our study, it would require 20 dummy 
variables, one for each year of the longest career. In addition, we run into problems with 
the dummy variable technique because we have too few players who have long 
careers. To simplify the computation of the likelihood function and be able to keep the 
long careers, we simply approximate the gt vector with a fourth- order polynomial of the 
players’ tenure in NBA, which reduces the number of parameters to be estimated from 
21 to 4. Thus, the hazard function becomes 
(10)    
 
where f(t) is a fourth-order polynomial of the player’s tenure in NBA. The fourth-order 
polynomial therefore includes tenure to the first, second, third, and fourth powers. Once 
again, we choose the Taylor series approximation technique over using tenure dummies 
due to the small number of observations for high tenures. The probit estimates the 
probability of exiting from a career, so instead of estimating the probability of being in 
the sample, as in Heckman’s approach, we estimate the probability of exiting the 
sample. 
 
Duration Results 
In Table 2, we report the results of the career duration semi-parametric analysis. We 
find that increases in all performance measures increase career length, while increases 
in draft number has a concave relation with career duration with increases in draft 
number increasing the probability of exit but at a decreasing rate. Both of these results 
suggest that performance increases the length of players’ careers suggesting that panel 
data may suffer from survival bias. In addition, we find increases in a player’s BMI raise 
the probability of exiting. The BMI was included to control for health issues that might 
influence career length. When it comes to exit discrimination, the coefficient on race is 
insignificant as is the coefficient on foreign-born. Overall, the results suggest the career 
length depends upon performance and not race or ethnicity. To control for survival bias, 
we calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio from this equation. 
 
Wage Equations Results 
In Table 3, we report the results of six log wage equations for NBA players using both 
fixed and random effects panel models. Verbeek and Nijman (1992) and Vella (1998) 
show that selectivity bias exists in panels and can be addressed with Heckman 
procedures. The wage equations cover the 1991-2008 seasons with the performance 
variables lagged in the wage equations. Independent variables include the same list 
used for the probit model of Table 2 with the exception of BMI and the higher order 
tenure variables. Following the findings of Hill (2004), height is included in the wage 
equation to make sure the race variable does not serve as a proxy for height of a player 
in specifications III and V. Height is excluded in the random effects specifications I, II, 
and IV to provide comparisons for the race variable when height is included. The 
dummy of foreign-born is excluded in I, II, and III to explore the robustness of the results 
of the race dummy variable. Tenure and tenure squared are inserted as explanatory 
variable to capture the traditional shape of the age earnings profile. Dummy variables 
are inserted for each year except 2008 to control for inflationary factors in pooling yearly 
data. The inverse Mill’s ratio   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. NBA Career Duration Semiparametric Analysis: 1989-2008. 
 
 
is included in all specifications except the first as an additional independent variable to 
correct for both exit discrimination and survival bias. The results of the log wage 
regressions in Table 3 all follow most of the traditional patterns. 
 
First, the expected results: in all four models, the coefficients of tenure are positive and 
significant; the coefficients of tenure squared are negative and significant. The shape of 
the age/earnings profile follows the classic pattern found throughout labor markets in 
general. Wages are also negatively and significantly correlated with draft number in a 
concave manner; earlier picks in the draft earn more money but the affect is less 
pronounced lower in the draft. Player performance measures are all statistically 
significant. Height itself is found to have a positive and significant effect on pay in all 
specifications. The dummy variables for each year follow the expected pattern: each 
year has a negative and significant effect on wages; only the coefficient of the dummy 
variable for 2007 is not significant. These results are excluded from the table and are 
available from the authors by request. 
 
The lack of significance of the dummy variable for White players in all the random 
effects specification except for specification V is also not surprising, given that most 
current research has not found discrimination in the NBA. The negative coefficient found 
in specification V, although surprising, highlights the problem of the residual technique 
in measuring labor market discrimination. Once controlling for NBA players who are 
foreign-born, where the vast majority are white, and for height, where White players are 
two inches taller than Black players, reverse discrimination is potentially found. The 
question then becomes are there other variables that are excluded where race serves 
as a proxy for missing variables. Model VI provides a fixed-effect comparison to the 
random effects models. The Hausman test suggests that the fixed-effect model is the 
statistically appropriate model. The fixed-effects model is appropriate because there is 
some correlation between the  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Log Wage Regressions: 1990-2008. 
 
Xs and the error term making the random effects estimates inconsistent. Therefore, 
using the random effects model is inappropriate and the coefficients on race must be 
viewed with caution. 
 
The coefficient of the inverse Mill’s Ratio is found to be negative and significant in all 
models. Survival bias appears to exist in the determination of wages but surprisingly the 
correction for survival bias does not significantly change the coefficients of any variables 
in the model. Perhaps the inverse Mill’s Ratio is capturing some heretofore unmeasured 
player trait that affects duration and salary but is unrelated to performance. Such traits 
could include personality, character, and/or leadership ability; all of these are difficult to 
quantify but desirable qualities for which management may pay a premium. While the 
construction of the modified Heckman technique may provide a new theoretical 
approach to capturing previously unquantifiable worker characteristics, it does not 
appear to offer any new insight into the measurement of racial pay discrimination. 
However, given the length of our panel data, an alternative approach exists that 
encompasses the lingering effects of any exit and/or wage discrimination from a 
different perspective.  
 
Career Earnings Regression Analysis 
Restricting our panel to players who began their careers in 1990 or later and ended their 
careers before the 2008 season, we create a deflated summation of these players’ 
career earnings.6 Summary statistics for the 707 players in this sample are shown in 
Table 4. African Americans born in the Unites States account for 70.4% of the sample 
while White players born in the United States total 18.1% of the group. Black and non-
Black foreign-born players compose just 2.3% and 9.2% of the sample, respectively. 
The Black U.S. players have higher career earnings on average than any of the other 
groups listed. They also have higher performance statistics on average for five of the six 
measures listed. The average height of the U.S.-born Black players is lower by over two 
inches or more compared to the other groups.  
 
We regress the log of the players’ deflated career earnings on a vector of demographic 
and performance variables: draft number and draft number squared, dummy variables 
equal to 1 for White and foreign-born players, height, BMI, average career points per 
game, average career rebounds per game, average career assists per game, average 
career steals per game, average career blocks per game, and average career turnovers 
per game. The results of four different versions of the basic model are presented in 
Table 5. In Model I, all of the variables listed above are included in the regression 
equation. All of the performance variables are properly signed and significant at the 
10% level or better. Career earnings rise with average career points, rebounds, assists, 
steals, and blocks; career earnings fall as average career turnovers increase. Players 
drafted earlier receive significantly higher lifetime earnings; the coefficient of draft 
number squared is insignificant. The coefficient of height is also not found to be 
significant. The variable body mass index does not display any  
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Summary Statistics for Career Earnings Regressions Data: 1990-2007. 
 
 
explanatory power. The coefficient of foreign-born is insignificant as well. However, the 
coefficient of the dummy variable for White is positive and significant at the 10% level. 
In regression Model II, BMI is dropped from the regression. None of the results from 
Model I are changed. In Model III, both body mass index and foreign-born are dropped 
from the basic regression equation. All the coefficients of the remaining variables are 
essentially unchanged; the t statistics of all the coefficients are also essentially 
unchanged except for a slight increase in the level of significance for White. To see if 
there is a correlation between Height and White as was found by both Groothuis and 
Hill (2004) in their duration analysis research and Hill (2004) in his panel and pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS) wage regression results, we remove Height from the 
equation for Model IV. The coefficient of White rose by over 25% and the level of 
significance increased. In Model V, only variables that are fixed at the time the player 
enters the NBA are included: draft number, draft number  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Career Earnings Regressions: 1990-2007. 
 
 
squared, dummy variable for White players, dummy variable for foreign-born players, 
height, and body mass index. This provides an ‘‘ex ante’’ view of the impact of being 
White on career earnings. The coefficient of White is not significant in this model nor are 
the coefficients of height, body mass index, and foreign-born. 
 
In all the models except Model V, the coefficient of the dummy variable for White is 
positive and significant suggesting a career pay premium for White players over and 
above levels suggested by their performance or draft position. The size of the premium 
varies from 15.7% to 20.8% depending on whether height is included in the model. 
However, the results of Model V suggest that these results are due to the endogeneity 
between career averages performance statistics and race. 
 
Conclusions, Implications, and Suggestions for Future Research 
The introduction of a Heckman Bias Technique modified for survival rather than 
selectivity fails to uncover any residual exit or pay discrimination in the NBA during the 
1990s through the 2008 except in one specification where reverse discrimination is 
found. This result, however, is not robust and is inconsistent because the fixed-effect 
model is found to be the superior technique. We suggest that caution should be used 
when interpreting the coefficients on the dummy variable on race in the residual 
technique. In addition, the new approach found that survival bias is present in NBA data 
but coefficients of wage equation variables are unaffected. These results suggest that 
on one hand researchers using panel data may feel satisfied that the lack of biased 
coefficients in our wage equations might mean such a bias does not exist. Caution 
should be exercised in this judgment. Sports wages are extremely deterministic 
compared to other market structures in which good performance variables are lacking. 
The technique introduced here to correct for survival bias needs to be tried in other 
labor market settings. This could prove a fruitful area for future research. 
 
The most surprising result of our analysis is found when we focus our attention on 
discrimination in career earnings. We find a premium paid in career earnings to White 
players, ceteris paribus, in the magnitude of 16%– 21%. Using the same data provides 
conflicting results; in the panel study, reverse discrimination is found; in career earnings, 
discrimination is found. We suggest the conflicting results are due to the limitations of 
the dummy variable technique. The results are not robust. Research that uses the 
residual method to measure discrimination must be viewed with a great deal of caution. 
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Notes 
1. Salary figures, height, weight, and draft numbers were obtained from Patricia 
Bender’s website: http://www.eskimo.com/*pbender/index.html. Performance statistics 
were found at Dougs’ NBA and MLB Statistics website: http://www.dougstats.com/. Data 
on race and place of birth were extracted from a variety of internet sources. 
 
2. In some years, there were less than 30 teams in the league. For undrafted players or 
for players who were selected when there were more than two rounds in the draft prior 
to 1989, we assigned 65 as the player’s draft number. 
 
3. To see theoretical underpinnings of the duration model used in this article, see 
Groothuis and Hill (2004, 2008). 
 
4. When higher order polynomials of the fifth and sixth power are included, results do 
not change suggesting that a fourth-order polynomial is flexible enough to capture the 
influence of the baseline hazard. 
 
5. We are indebted to an anonymous referee of the Journal of Sports Economics for 
suggesting this approach. 
 
6. We deflated salaries using a 1982-1984 base year CPI index. 
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